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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
treated as if it were a citizen of the state where it is incorporated.1 6 Likewise,
national banks are, for purposes of private actions, ".

.

. deemed citizens of

the State in which they are respectively located." 11 (Emphasis added). It is
submitted that if illogical fictions such as these can extend jurisdiction by
calling organizations "citizens for the purpose of diversity of citizenship," it
is not too great a stretch to call the District of Columbia a "state" for the
purpose of diversity of citizenship. Congress resorted to this fiction. In 1948,
when it reenacted in substance the 1940 amendment, it included that, "The
word 'state' as used in this section includes the Territories and the District
of Columbia." I

The Territories and the District of Columbia are not states in the same
sense as Florida, Michigan or New York, but they are defined territories
with a distinct government and a settled population made up mainly of citizens
of the United States. They are perhaps enough like states to be treated like
them for the purpose of diversity of citizenship. As pointed out, jurisdiction
based on fictions is not new. At least the present language appeals strongly
to the lawyer's instinct to reach a fair result by giving an old word a new
meaning.

MONOPOLIES-APPLICATION OF CLAYTON ACT
TO FORBID EXCLUSIVE SUPPLY CONTRACTS
An injunction was sought by the United States Government to prevent
defendant from enforcing or entering into exclusive supply contracts with any
independent dealer in petroleum products and automobile accessories. The
allegedly monopolistic contracts were of several types, but all provided that
the dealer was to purchase from defendant all his requirements for one or
more products. Defendant's sales of gasoline in the area resulting from such
contracts were approximately $57,000,000 which sum constituted 6.7% of
the total sale of gasoline for the area. The contracts were assailed as being
violative of § 3 of the Clayton Act. A decree enjoining defendant from enforcing or entering into such contracts was granted by the district court. On
appeal, Held, sales by the defendant constituted a substantial volume of business; therefore, the exclusive requirements contracts probably substantially
16. Louisville, C., & C. Ry. v. Letson, 2 How. 497 (U. S. 1844).
17. 28 U. S. C. A. § 1348 (1948).
18. 62 STAT, 869 (1948), 28 U. S. C. A. § 1332(b) (1948).

1. "It shall be unlawful for any person ... to , . . contract for sale of goods .. .
whether patented or unpatented ... on the condition ... that the purchaser thereof...
shall not deal in the goods ... of a competitor . . . where the effect of such . .. contract
I . . may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly . . ." 38
STAT. 731, 15 U. S. C. 14 (1914).

CASES NOTED
lessened competition and were illegal under the Clayton Act. Standard Oil
Co. of California v. United States, 69 Sup. Ct. 1051 (1949).
Section 3 of the Clayton Act renders illegal contracts by which the
buyer is required to purchase certain products of the seller as a condition of
buying the seller's patented products (tie-in contracts) and contracts requiring the buyer to purchase specified products exclusively from the seller
(requirements contracts) where the effect of such contracts may be to substantially lessen competition. The agreements prohibited by the section are
specifically defined but when such contracts are illegal is a matter of deciding
when their effect may be to substantially lessen competition.
It has been held that § 3 was intended to prevent only a probable, rather
than any remotely possible, lessening of competition. 2 In determining what
was to constitute a probable lessening of competition, it was indicated that,
instead of following the "rule of reason" 3 employed in judging cases under
the Sherman Act, whereby it was necessary to show either factual proof of
the agreements or that the agreements were illegal per se,4 it was necessary
to find a standard specifically applicable to § 3.5 Despite its disavowal of the
necessity of following the "rule of reason test," it was felt necessary to have
some showing as to the economic consequences of the agreements defined
in § 3. A standard for determining a probable substantial lessening of competition was adopted which required either: (1) factual proof as to the
economic consequences of the agreement; 6 or, (2) a showing that the seller
controlled a large percentage of the market,1 from which showing the court
could infer that the probable effect of the agreements was a substantial lessening of competition. 8
In InternationalSalt Co. v. United States,9 involving agreements tying
the sale of non-patented to patented products, the court discarded the necessity
of showing either economic consequences or dominance of a large percentage
of the market. It was there held sufficient to show that the business of the
seller was not "insignificant" or "insubstantial" for the court to find that the
probable effect of the agreements was a substantial lessening of competition.',
2. See Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston, 258 U. S. 346, 357 (1922).
3. Employment of rule of reason, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S.
1 (1911); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 106 (1911).
4. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940) ; Schine Theatres
v. United States, 334 U. S. 110 (1948).
5. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston, 258 U. S. 346 (1922).
6. Federal Trade Comm. v. Sinclair, 261 U. S. 463 (1923); Pick Mfg. Co. v. General
Motors Corp., 299 U. S. 3 (1936) ; B. S. Pearsall Butter Co. v. Federal Trade Comm.,
292 Fed. 720 (C. C. A. 7th 1934).
7. United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U. S. 451 (1922) (seller controlled 95% of market) ; Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm., 312 U. S.
457 (1941) (sold to twelve thousand dealers) ; Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Flouston,
258 U. S. 346 (1922) (seller controlled 40% of market).
8. As to when a market is substantial compare United States v. Yellow Cab Co..
332 U. S. 218 (1947), with United States v. Columbia Steel, 334 U. S. 495 (1948).
9. 332 U. S. 392 (1947).
10. Id. at 396.

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
The court did not state whether this broad application of § 3 was to be used
only in the case of tying contracts or to cover requirements contracts as well.
Subsequently, in United States v. Columbia Steel,' the court cited the International Salt Case as standing for the proposition that contracts are illegal
per se upon a showing that the seller's business is substantial, but then adds
that all exclusive requirements contracts are not invalid until factual proof
of economic consequences or dominance of a large part of the market is
shown.' 2 It would appear from this dictum that the court had decided to
adopt two standards of legality pertaining to § 3. One standard, applying only
to tying contracts, would require only a showing of a substantial volume
of business affected in order for the court to determine that the effect of the
contracts is a substantial lessening of competition. The other standard, applying to requirements contracts, would require either a showing of economic
consequences or a showing of dominance of a large percentage of the market.
However, in the principal case, the court has refuted all previous indications of adopting two standards of legality. It applies the stringent rule of
the International Salt Case to a case involving only requirements contracts
with no patented products involved holding such contracts illegal upon a showing that the seller's business is substantial. The finding that the business of
defendant was substantial was sufficient for the court to determine that the
effect of the requirements contracts was a probable lessening of competition.
The court did not apply the International Salt rule blindly, but gave
consideration to the possible economic advantages offered to the small dealer
through requirements contracts as contrasted with the lack of advantages of
tying contracts.'8 Stating that actual proof of effect of the agreements was
impossible of being accurately weighed by the court, the standard of International Salt, requiring only that the volume of business be substantial, was
adopted as the test of legality of requirements contracts under § 3.
The effect of the decision is to deny the use of requirements contracts
to big business solely because of its bigness. As to determining that point
in size at which requirements contracts become illegal, the decision dispenses
with the comparative method based on percentage control of the total market,
and substitutes a quantitative point based only on the sellers volume of business. This quantitative point is that point at which the volume of business
becomes substantial. The decision does not dispel the mist surrounding the
interpretation of substantial. It only decides that $57,000,000, though only
6.7% of the total sales, is a substantial volume of business. No indication is
given as to what will be considered substantial in future decisions.
11. Supra.
12. Id. at 523.
13. For a discussion of the economic aspects of requirements contracts see Stock-

hausen, The Commercial and Anti-Trust Aspects of Term and Requirements Contracts,

23 N. Y. U. L. Rav. 412 (1948).

